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Humans and animals are exquisitely, though idiosyncratically, sensitive to risk or variance in the outcomes of their actions. Economic,
psychological, and neural aspects of this are well studiedwhen information about risk is provided explicitly. However, wemust normally
learn about outcomes from experience, through trial and error. Traditional models of such reinforcement learning focus on learning
about the mean reward value of cues and ignore higher order moments such as variance. We used fMRI to test whether the neural
correlates of human reinforcement learning are sensitive to experienced risk. Our analysis focused on anatomically delineated regions of
a priori interest in the nucleus accumbens, where blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals have been suggested as correlating
with quantities derived from reinforcement learning. We first provide unbiased evidence that the raw BOLD signal in these regions
corresponds closely to a reward prediction error.We then derive from this signal the learned values of cues that predict rewards of equal
mean but different variance and show that these values are indeed modulated by experienced risk. Moreover, a close neurometric–
psychometric coupling exists between the fluctuations of the experience-based evaluations of risky options that we measured neurally
and the fluctuations in behavioral risk aversion. This suggests that risk sensitivity is integral to human learning, illuminating economic
models of choice, neuroscientific models of affective learning, and the workings of the underlying neural mechanisms.
Introduction
As the recent economic downturn has shown, our attitude to risk
during decisionmaking can havemajor consequences. Sensitivity
to risk (defined as the variance associated with an outcome) is a
well-established phenomenon central tomodels of decisionmak-
ing in economics (Bernoulli, 1954), ethology (Kacelnik and Bate-
son, 1996), and neuroscience (Platt andHuettel, 2008).However,
the mechanisms by which risk comes to influence the decision
process are as yet unknown.
Much of our current understanding of the neural processes
that give rise to risk sensitivity comes from studies that provided
explicit information about the probabilities and magnitudes as-
sociated with a gamble (Elliott et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2005, 2009;
Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Kuhnen andKnutson, 2005; Preuschoff
et al., 2006, 2008; Tobler et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007). However,
we often do not have such knowledge a priori, but rather must
learn about the different payoffs and their probabilities through
experience (Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig and Erev, 2009). Al-
though experiential decision making may depend on processes
that are, at least partly, distinct from those invoked by explicit
information (Jessup et al., 2008; Fitzgerald et al., 2010), the effects
of risk on experiential learning have been less well studied. In-
deed, traditional computational models of trial-and-error rein-
forcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) that have proven
invaluable in understanding the neural basis of human and ani-
mal experiential learning concentrate only on learning the mean
(expected) value of different options, ignoring their variance.
Two interesting possibilities exist: Learning about means and
variancesmaybe separated in thebrain,with theneural substrates of
reinforcement learningconcentratingonlyon learningmeans, asper
the theory. Alternatively, reinforcement learningmight itself be risk
sensitive, due to nonlinear subjective utilities for outcomes (Ber-
noulli, 1954), nonlinear effects of unpredictable outcomes on the
learning process (Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002), or both.
Here, we concentrate on learning about, and choosing be-
tween, two stimuli associated with equal mean rewards but dif-
ferent variances: a “sure” stimulus associated with a 20¢ reward
and a “risky” stimulus associated with 50% chance of receiving
either 40¢ or 0¢. In our experiment, subjects were not told these
payoffs, but had to experience them. Thus, we expected neural
values of the stimuli to be learned through, and to fluctuate ac-
cording to, an experiential reinforcement-learning process. In
this situation, we asked whether or not these neural values are
sensitive to the variance or risk associated with different options.
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We first show a close correspondence between fMRI blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals in the anatomically
delineated nucleus accumbens (NAC) and a hypothetical,model-
derived reward prediction error signal. We then extract stimulus
values from this signal and show a close neurometric–psycho-
metric relationship between learned values and behavioral
choice. This suggests that values learned through reinforcement
learning are sensitive to risk and, furthermore, that these values
affect decision making. Behavioral and neural analyses show that
nonlinear utilities associated with sure outcomes do not fully
account for this risk sensitivity, raising the possibility that the
learning process is itself sensitive to variance.
Materials andMethods
Subjects
Sixteen subjects (four female; age, 18–34;mean, 24 years) participated in
the study. An additional four subjects were scanned but were excluded
from analysis, one due to color blindness and three due to failure to
understand the task. Subjects first performed a practice session outside
the scanner and then performed the task in the scanner. Subjects were
remunerated according to the amount of money they won during the
task (mean, $50.7; range, $42–$54; two subjects were also given a $5
compensation for showing up, which was later discontinued). All sub-
jects gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology.
Behavioral task
Subjects performed a mixed instrumental conditioning and classical
conditioning task in which they chose between different visual stimuli
displayed on a computer monitor to earnmonetary rewards (Fig. 1). For
each subject, five different-colored stimuli (portrayed as casino-style slot
machines or bandits) were drawn randomly out of a total of six possible
stimuli (yellow, orange, purple, green, red, or blue) and randomly allo-
cated to five payoff schedules: sure 40¢, sure 20¢, two sure 0¢ stimuli, and
one variable-payoff risky stimulus associated with equal probabilities of
0¢ or 40¢ payoffs (henceforth denoted the “0/40¢” stimulus). Subjects
were never informed about the payoffs associatedwith the different stim-
uli, but had to estimate them from experience.
Two types of trials were intermixed randomly: choice trials and forced
trials. In choice trials, two stimuli were displayed (left and right location
randomized), and the subject was instructed to quickly select one of them
by pressing either the left or right button on a button box. The chosen
stimulus was then animated to emulate a spinning slot machine until 5 s
had passed from the time of stimulus onset. The payoff associated with
the chosen stimulus was then displayed for 500 ms. After a variable
(uniformly distributed) intertrial interval of 2–5 s, the next trial began. In
forced trials, only one stimulus was displayed on either the left or right
side of the screen, and the subject had to indicate its location using the
button box to cause the animation and obtain its associated outcome.
Constant interstimulus intervals and variable intertrial intervals were
chosen to allow for precisely timed predictions within a trial but not
between trials. All button presses were timed out after 1 s, at which time
the trial was abortedwith amessage indicating that the response was “too
slow” and the intertrial interval commenced. Subjects were instructed to
try to maximize their winnings and were paid according to their actual
payoffs in the task.
Subjects were first familiarized with the task and provided with several
observations of the stimulus–reward mapping in a training phase that
included two subparts. The first part involved 10 randomly ordered
forced trials (two per stimulus). The second part comprised 12 randomly
ordered choice trials (two of each of six types of choice trials: 20¢ versus
0/40¢, 40¢ versus 0/40¢, 20¢ versus 40¢, 0¢ versus 0/40¢, 0¢ versus 20¢,
and 0¢ versus 0¢). On-screen instructions for the task informed subjects
that they would see five different slot machines, each associated with
certain monetary rewards, and that they would play these machines with
the goal of earning as much money as possible. They were also told
explicitly that payoffs depended only on the slot machine chosen, not on
its location or on their history of choices.
The experimental task was then performed inside an MRI scanner.
On-screen instructions informed subjects that they would encounter the
same stimuli as in the training phase. They were briefly reminded of the
rules and encouraged to choose those machines that yielded the highest
payoffs, as they would be paid their earnings in this part. The task con-
sisted of 234 trials (three sessions of 78 trials each, with short breaks in
between), with choice and forced trials randomly intermixed. The trials
comprised (1) 30 “risk” choice trials involving a choice between the 20¢
stimulus and the 0/40¢ stimulus (from which we assessed subjects’ be-
havioral risk sensitivity); (2) 20 “test” choice trials involving each of the
pairs 40¢ versus 0/40¢, 20¢ versus 40¢, 0¢ versus 0/40¢, and 0¢ versus 20¢
(from which we assessed learning of the payoffs according to the fre-
quency with which subjects chose the better option); (3) 24 forced trials
involving each of the stimuli (16 only for each of the 0¢ stimuli), which
were used to assess the neural representation of the value of the stimulus
(see fMRI analysis below) uncontaminated by the presence of, or com-
petition with, other stimuli; and (4) 20 trials in which subjects chose
between the two 0¢ stimuli. These were originally designed as baseline
trials; however, the analysis reported here does not make special use of
them.
Trial order was randomized subject to the constraint that each half of
the trials included exactly one half of all types of trials in the experiment.
To minimize priming of responses in the critical trials that assessed risk
sensitivity, trial order was further constrained such that a 20¢ versus
0/40¢ choice trial could not immediately follow a forced trial of one of its
components. Payoffs for the 0/40¢ stimulus were counterbalanced in
advance such that groups of eight consecutive payoffs included exactly
four 40¢ payoffs (“wins”) and four 0¢ payoffs (“losses”), and such that
streaks of winning or losing were no longer than four. Although this
preadjustment would make the “gambler’s fallacy” true in the unlikely
event that it was detected by the subjects, we used this counterbalancing
method to eliminate between-subject differences due to potential vari-
ability in the actual experienced percentage of wins. All task events were
controlled using Cogent (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neurosci-
ence, London, UK).
Models of risk-sensitive choice
Temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto,
1998) offers a general framework for understanding trial-and-error
learning and decision making in circumstances like this, and also for
linking choice behavior to neurophysiological and fMRI signals (Barto,
Figure 1. A reinforcement-learning task designed to assess the dynamic effects of risk on choice behavior and learning processes. In each trial, one or two slot machines differing in color and
abstract symbol were presented on the left or right side of the screen. Subjects had to choose one of the two machines or indicate the location of the single machine. This triggered the rolling
animation of the slot machine, followed by text describing the amount of money won.
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1995;Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997;O’Doherty et al., 2004; Li
et al., 2006; Scho¨nberg et al., 2007). Reinforcement learning postulates
that subjects use past experience to estimate values for the different stim-
uli [denotedV(S)] corresponding to the expected payoffs to which these
stimuli lead and, given a choice, pick between stimuli based on their
values.
Three variants of TD learning that can give rise to risk-sensitive behav-
ior are illustrated in Figure 3.
TD model. The TD model is a standard temporal difference learning
model (Barto, 1995; Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this
model, a prediction error (t) r(t) V(t) V(t 1) is computed at
each of two consecutive time steps (tstimulus and toutcome tstimulus 1),
whereV(t) is the predicted value at time t, and r(t) is the reward at time t.
The prediction error at toutcome is used to update V(C), the value of the
chosen stimulus, according to Vnew(C)  Vold(C)    (toutcome),
with  being a learning rate or step-size parameter.
Utility model. The utility model is a TD learning model that incorpo-
rates nonlinear subjective utilities (Bernoulli, 1954) for the different
amounts of reward. In this model, the prediction error is (t) U(r(t))
V(t)  V(t  1), where U(r(t)) is the subjective utility of the reward at
time t, and the update rule is the same as in the TD model above:
Vnew(C)  Vold(C)   (toutcome). To model the subjective utility of
the reward, we assumed (without loss of generality) that U(0)  0,
U(20)  20, and U(40)  a · 20. Values of a that are smaller than 2 are
thus consistent with a concave subjective utility curve, and a  2 is
consistent with a convex utility curve.
Risk-sensitive TD model. In the risk-sensitive TD (RSTD) model, pos-
itive and negative prediction errors have asymmetric effects on learning
(Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002). Prediction errors in this model are sim-
ilar to those in the TD model above, (t)  r(t)  V(t)  V(t  1);
however, there are separate update rules for positive and negative predic-
tion errors [as in the study by Shapiro et al. (2001)]:
VnewC   VoldC    toutcome if toutcome  0,VoldC    toutcome if toutcome  0,
(1)
such that if  , the effect of negative prediction errors on learned
values is larger than that of positive errors, leading to risk aversion, and
vice versa if   .
Using a trial-based (finite horizon) reinforcement-learning scheme,
we modeled prediction errors at two time points in each trial: the time at
which the stimulus is presented (tstimulus) and the time at which the
outcome is delivered (toutcome tstimulus 1). At stimulus onset, in the
absence of reward and assuming that the prior expectation V(tstimulus
1) is zero (a common assumption based on recordings from dopaminer-
gic neurons, which show that the neural activity at stimulus onset reflects
a prediction error comparing the value of that stimulus to zero, rather
than to the average reward obtainable in the experiment; Fiorillo et al.,
2003; Tobler et al., 2005), the prediction error is (t) V(tstimulus), that
is, the predicted reward for this trial, which is the value of the chosen
stimulus V(C). At outcome onset, r(toutcome) depends on the actual out-
come presented to the subject, and we assumed that V(toutcome), the
expected reward in the intertrial interval, is zero. Thus, the prediction
error (toutcome) r(toutcome)V(toutcome 1) r(toutcome)V(C) is
the difference between the obtained and the expected outcome [as in the
study by Rescorla and Wagner (1972)].
Additionally, for all three models we assumed a softmax action selec-
tion function:
pA 
eV A
eV A  eVB

1
1  eV AVB
, (2)
where P(A) is the probability of choosing stimulus A, and  is an inverse
temperature parameter.
Model fitting and model comparison
We used subjects’ behavioral data from both training and test sessions to
fit the free parameters of the three models:  and  for the TDmodel; ,
a, and  for the utility model; and , , and  for the RSTD model.
Model likelihoodswere based on assigning probabilities to the 142 choice
trials for each subject, according to the softmax function (Eq. 2). We
modeled learning of values in all 256 training and test trials; thus, forced
trials also contributed to the model likelihoods, albeit indirectly.
As we were interested specifically in intersubject differences, we did
not pool data across subjects, but rather fit each subject’s parameters
separately. To facilitate this in the face of the multiplicative interaction
between learning rates and softmax inverse temperatures in the model,
we used regularizing priors that favored realistic values and maximum a
posteriori (rather than maximum likelihood) fitting (Daw, 2011). This
prevented any unreasonable individual fits. Thus, learning rates were
constrained to the range 0    1 with a Beta (2,2) prior distribution
slightly favoring values that were in the middle of this range, and the
inverse temperature was constrained to be positive with a Gamma (2,3)
prior distribution that favored lower values. Additionally, the utility pa-
rameter was constrained to the range 1 a 30 (with a uniform prior).
Priors were implemented by adding to the data log likelihood, for each
setting of the parameters, the log probability of the parameters given the
prior distribution. Stimulus valueswere initialized to 0.Under a standard
Kalman filter scheme, it would be optimal for learning rates to start high
and decay as experience with the stimuli accumulates (Dayan et al.,
2000).We approximated this effect by adding a decaying learning rated
 0.5/(1  Ts) (with Ts being the number of trials in which the conse-
quences of stimulus S had been experienced) to the constant (fit) learn-
ing rate(s). This predominantly affected learning in the training trials.
[We could not simply fit different learning rates for the training and the
test trials due to the small number of training trials; however, fitting the
three models to test data only while initializing stimulus values to their
correct values [0,0,20,40,20] (or, in the case of the utility model, their
nonlinear counterparts) and eschewing the decaying learning rate, gave
similar results.]We optimizedmodel parameters byminimizing the neg-
ative log posterior of the data given different settings of the model pa-
rameters using the Matlab function fminunc. This function performs
unconstrained linear optimization using a subspace trust-regionmethod
that approximates the objective function using a Taylor expansion
around the current point andminimizes it within a subspace around this
point.We used the “large-scale optimization” algorithmof fminunc; that
is, we provided fminuncwith a custom-built routine that computed both
the negative log posterior probability of the data given any setting of the
parameters and its analytical partial derivativeswith respect to each of the
parameters, evaluated at the current setting of the parameters. To facili-
tate finding the global maximum of the log posterior, we ran the routine
multiple times for each subject, starting each run from random initial
values for the parameters, and kept track of the highest value of the log
posterior achieved.
We assessed the contribution of the extra parameters in the utility and
RSTD models to the overall data likelihood using a likelihood ratio test
for nested models and the maximum a posteriori parameters for each
model. In this, twice the difference in log likelihoods of the RSTD or
utility model and the TD model was compared to a 	 2 statistic with one
degree of freedom (the number of extra parameters in themore complex
model). Comparisons between the RSTD and utility models, which had
the same number of parameters, were performed directly on the poste-
rior probability of the models evaluated using the maximum a posteriori
parameters.
fMRI data acquisition
Functional brain images were acquired using a Siemens 3.0 Tesla Trio
MRI scanner. Gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPIs)
with BOLD contrast were acquired at an oblique orientation of 30° to the
anterior–posterior commissure line, using an eight-channel phased array
coil. Each volume comprised 32 axial slices. Volumes were collected
during the experiment in an interleaved ascending manner, with the
following imaging parameters: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm;
in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2s.
Whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1  1  1
mm) were also acquired for all subjects and coregistered with their mean
EPIs. These were used to map anatomical regions of interest in the right
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and left nucleus accumbens for each subject, and were averaged together
to permit anatomical localization of functional activations at the group
level.
Preprocessing of the images and whole-brain image analysis were per-
formed using SPM2 (statistical parametric mapping software; Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London,
UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/spm2.html). Preprocessing of
EPIs included temporal normalization (adjusting each slice to themiddle
of the scan), subject motion correction (rigid body realignment of all
images to the first volume), and spatial normalization to a standard T2*
template in Montreal Neurological Institute space. Anatomical images
were also normalized to the same template, and anatomical regions of
interest (ROIs) were marked for each subject using Analysis of Func-
tional NeuroImages (Cox, 1996). Whole-brain images were then further
preprocessed by spatially smoothing the images using a Gaussian kernel
(with a full-width at half-maximum of 8 mm) to allow for statistical
parametric mapping analysis.
ROI analysis
A wealth of evidence suggests that prediction error signals based on a
diverse array of rewards can be seen in BOLD fMRI activity in areas such
as the NAC in the ventral striatum (Breiter et al., 2001; McClure et al.,
2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004; Abler et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006;
Preuschoff et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008). These prediction error signals
have a precise computational interpretation as the momentary differ-
ences between expected and obtained outcomes (Niv and Schoenbaum,
2008). Prediction errors are not the same as value signals—value signals
are prolonged, in our case spanning the interval between cue onset
(which gives rise to the expected value) and receipt of the outcome,
whereas prediction errors correspond to momentary differences in ex-
pected value (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). However, given a tailored
experimental design such as we use here, neural values of cues [in our
case, the value of a chosen stimulus V(C)] can be extracted from predic-
tion error signals at the time of cue onset. We thus chose a priori to
concentrate on BOLD signals in the NAC to compare different models
for learning the values of sure versus risky stimuli.
The NAC was anatomically defined as the area bordered ventrally by
the caudate nucleus, dorsally by the anterior commisure, laterally by the
globus pallidus and putamen, and medially by the septum pellucidum.
The border with the caudate was taken to be at the bottom of the lateral
ventricle, and with the putamen at the thinnest part of gray matter. We
considered the anteriormost border to be at the axial slice in which the
caudate and putamen fully separated and the posterior border to be
where the anterior commisure was fully attached between hemispheres.
Voxels in functional spacewere taken thatwerewhollywithin theNACas
delineated in the higher-resolution anatomical space. This resulted in
means of 36.75 and 40.62 voxels for the left and right NAC ROIs, respec-
tively (ranges, 24–52 and 26–66 voxels, respectively). Data were then
extracted for each of the two anatomical ROI and averaged per ROI using
singular value decomposition. This resulted in two time course vectors of
BOLD activity (with samples every 2 s) for each subject on which all
additional ROI analyses were conducted. Parallel analyses performed on
more inclusive ROIs that also incorporated voxels that were only partly
within the NAC (means, 58.56 and 59.75; ranges, 37–82 and 43–79 vox-
els for left and right NAC ROIs, respectively) showed similar results and
are not reported.
To analyze the ROI time courses, we first removed effects of no interest
due to scanner drift and subject motion from the time course activity by
estimating and subtracting from the data, for each session separately, a
linear regression model that included six motion regressors (3D transla-
tion and rotation), two trend regressors (linear and quadratic), and a
baseline. To compare the remaining signal to a theoreticalmodel-derived
prediction error signal, we then upsampled the raw, corrected time
courses to 100 ms resolution using spline interpolation and averaged the
time courses across the bilateral ROIs, all subjects, and similar trials
(upsampling was done for the purpose of this comparison only; all sub-
sequent analyses were performed on the original time course data). To
verify statistically that the signal in each of the two ROIs corresponds to a
prediction error signal (t)V(t) r(t)V(t 1), we regressed against
each of the ROI time courses a linear model that included in three differ-
ent regressors the three necessary components of the prediction error in
this one-step task: V(tstimulus) at stimulus onset [which is V(C), the cur-
rent value of the chosen stimulus], r(toutcome) at reward onset, and
V(toutcome  1) [which is V(C)] at reward onset. To conclude that
the BOLD activity corresponds to a prediction error signal, we required
that the ROI time series be significantly correlated with each of these
three regressors at p 0.05 across subjects and that these correlations be
positive. Moreover, we tested for equality of the regression coefficients
for r(toutcome) and V(toutcome  1) using the method suggested by
Rouder et al. (2009); that is, we computed Bayes factors measuring the
odds for the hypothesis that these regressors are equal compared to the
hypothesis that they are unequal, using both an uninformative and a
unit-informative prior on the alternative hypothesis.When computed in
this manner, Bayes factors1 support the null hypothesis over the alter-
native, with the commonly used cutoff for support for one hypothesis
versus another being at least three (Rouder et al., 2009). We did not test
for similar equality of the regressor coefficients of V(tstimulus) and
V(toutcome  1), as these may differ due to discounting of future re-
wards, the degree of which we could not estimate using the current fixed-
interstimulus-interval design.
We then used the ROI time courses to estimate the value of each
stimulus. For this we estimated themean BOLD response corresponding
to the time of stimulus onset in forced trials by estimating two additional
regressionmodels. These designs included separate stimulus-onset stick-
function regressors for each of the four types of forced trials (collapsing
across the two 0¢ stimuli). In the first design, the onset regressors were
modeled across the whole experiment (four regressors in total). In the
second design, they were modeled for each session separately (12 regres-
sors in total). Due to large between-subject differences in the initial ex-
perience of the risky 0/40¢ stimulus, the first two forced trials of this
stimulus were not included in the stick regressors. [Including these trials
does not change any of our results; however, with these trials included,
the TD model also predicts a weakly significant relationship between
behavioral risk aversion and the difference in values of the 20 and 0/40
stimuli, which is absent otherwise (supplemental Fig. 2, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).] To deconvolve from
these signals of interest other NAC activations due to outcome presenta-
tion and due to the onset of choice trials, we also modeled temporal
difference errors for all other events in a separate regressor (or in three
regressors, one for each session, in the second design). To generate the
prediction error for each subject at these times, we used the subject’s
actual experienced choices and rewards and maximum a posteriori pa-
rameters for the RSTD model (results using the TD or utility model
insteadwere similar and are not shown). Following the convention in the
literature (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Scho¨nberg et al.,
2007), we modeled the prediction error at stimulus onset as that corre-
sponding to the to-be-chosen stimulus. All regressors were created as
covariate regressors and convolved with a canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function before being entered into the designmatrix. The values
for the stick-function regressors for each subject were then treated as
estimates of the mean value of each stimulus in each session, and differ-
ences in values were correlated with behavioral risk sensitivity as mea-
sured by the proportion of choices of the 20¢ stimulus in the 20¢ versus
0/40¢ choice trials. All ROImodel fitting and statistical analysis was done
using software written in Matlab (MathWorks).
Whole-brain analysis
A supplemental whole-brain image analysis was performed using SPM2.
In this, we searched for brain areas in which BOLD activity correlates
with a prediction error signal. The design matrix comprised, for each of
the three sessions, a regressor for prediction errors, two stick-function
regressors for stimulus onsets and for outcome onsets, and nuisance
covariate regressors for motion, linear and quadratic drift, and baseline.
The prediction error regressor was created as a covariate regressor by
convolving the punctate prediction errors as modeled via the RSTD
model (using the maximum a posteriori parameters for each subject)
with the canonical hemodynamic response function. Other stick regres-
sors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function
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as is usual in SPM2. The six scan-to-scan motion parameters produced
during realignment were used as nuisance motion regressors to account
for residual effects of movement. This design matrix was entered into a
regression analysis of the fMRI data of each subject. A linear contrast of
regressor coefficients was then computed at the single-subject level for
the temporal difference regressor. The results were analyzed as random
effects at a second, between-subjects level by including the contrast im-
ages from each subject in a one-way ANOVA with no mean term.
Group-level activations were localized using the group-averaged
structural scan, and functional ROIs were marked on the group-level
statistical parametric map using xjView (http://www.alivelearn.
net/xjview). We analyzed activations at a whole-brain familywise error-
corrected threshold of p 0.05 (corresponding to t(15) 7.38). For each
of the five functional ROIs identified, we extracted time course activity
for every subject, averaging over voxels within the ROI using singular
value decomposition. As in the NAC analysis above, we first removed
effects of no interest due to scanner drift and subject motion from the
time course activity in each ROI by estimating and subtracting from the
data, for each session separately, a linear regression model that included
sixmotion regressors (3D translation and rotation), two trend regressors
(linear and quadratic), and a baseline.We then tested whether each func-
tional ROI corresponded to a prediction error signal using the same
analysis applied to the anatomical ROI time course data. To conclude
that BOLD activity in an ROI corresponded to a prediction error signal,
we required that the ROI time series be significantly correlated with each
of the three component regressors of a prediction error signal at p 0.05
across subjects.
Results
We scanned human subjects using fMRI while they performed a
learning and decision making task in which they chose between
different stimuli to earn monetary rewards. Four stimuli were
associated with fixed payoffs of 0¢, 0¢, 20¢, and 40¢, and one
stimulus was associated with a risky 50% probability of receiving
either 0¢ or 40¢ (called the 0/40¢ stimulus). Subjects were not
informed about these payoffs, but had to learn them from expe-
rience. The task consisted of choice trials, in which subjects chose
one of two stimuli with the aim of maximizing monetary earn-
ings, and forced trials, in which only one stimulus was available
and subjects earned its associated payoff (Fig. 1). We were espe-
cially interested in learning about, and choices between, the 20¢
and 0/40¢ stimuli, which had the samemean payoff but different
variances, or risk.
Behavior
We first examined performance in choice trials in which one of
the two options is objectively better than the other one (40¢ vs
0/40¢, 20¢ vs 40¢, 0¢ vs 0/40¢, and 0¢ vs 20¢). This showed that
subjects had learned the payoffs associated with the different
stimuli such that they could make the correct choice on most
trials (78%correct choices in the first test session, 95% in the final
test session; t(15) 4.66; p 0.0005, paired one-tailed Student’s t
test). Individual learning curves further confirmed that all 16
subjects had mastered the task (supplemental Fig. 1, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
In contrast to trials in which one stimulus was objectively
better than the other, ourmain focuswas on understanding those
choices in which there was no “correct” answer, namely, the
choices between the sure 20¢ and the risky 0/40¢ stimuli, and how
these were influenced by fluctuating experience-based estima-
tions of the value of the risky stimulus. Figure 2 shows each sub-
ject’s preference in these risky choice trials for the sure 20¢ option
in the three sessions. As expected (Huettel et al., 2006; Hayden
and Platt, 2008), risk sensitivity variedwidely among the subjects,
with the majority preferring the sure option and only a few pre-
ferring the risky option. Moreover, risk preference was not
stationary throughout the experimental sessions, even within
individual subjects. We thus set out to explain this behavioral
variability both computationally and neurally, by contrasting
three possible explanations for risk-sensitive choice.
Model fits
To understand subjects’ choice behavior, we used the framework
of reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) that has been
widely used to model trial-and-error learning and decision mak-
ing (Niv, 2009). Basic reinforcement-learning models, and spe-
cifically temporal difference learning, concentrate on estimating
only the mean outcome for each stimulus and do not explicitly
take risk into account. However, risk-sensitive variants have been
suggested. We compared three variants of TD learning, dia-
gramed in Figure 3.
The first model we considered, basic TD learning, does not
track variance. However, risk aversion arises implicitly in this
model from biased sampling due to the interaction between
choice and learning (March, 1996; Denrell andMarch, 2001; Niv
et al., 2002; Hertwig et al., 2004; Denrell, 2007). This is illustrated
in Figure 3a and arises because risky stimuli are, by definition,
associated with outcomes that are larger or smaller than their
means. Learned predictive values will thus fluctuate above and
below the mean according to the specific sequence of past expe-
rienced rewards. When the value fluctuates below the mean, the
risky option will be chosen less frequently, and thus its value will
not be updated. As a result, the value of the risky option will be
lower than its actualmean payoffmore often than it will be higher
than the mean payoff, and choices of the risky option will, on
average, be suppressed. The higher the learning rate , the larger
the fluctuations in the estimated value, and so the greater the risk
aversion (Niv et al., 2002). This was borne out by the model fits:
across subjects, the fit learning rate tended to be higher for
more risk-averse subjects (Fig. 3d; Pearson’s correlation, r 
0.38). Thus, even the basic, risk-neutral, TD model might ac-
count for risk sensitivity, although we note that basic TD
learning is, a priori, an unlikely explanation for behavior in
our task because it cannot generate risk-seeking behavior, and
because, by design, the effects of these biases were mitigated by
the forced trials.
The secondmodelwe considered, the utilitymodel (Fig. 3b), is
the standard explanation for risk sensitivity from economics.
This involves convex or concave subjective utilities for the out-
comes (Bernoulli, 1954) that are incorporated into TD learning.
Here, as in the previousmodel, outcome variance is not explicitly
Figure 2. Risk sensitivity varied between subjects and across sessions within subjects. The
percent choice of the sure 20¢ stimulus over the risky 0/40¢ stimulus in each of three experi-
mental sessions is plotted for each subject (	10 choices per subject per session).
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taken into account. Instead, risk-sensitive preferences emerge be-
cause the two options that have objectively been designated as
having the same mean payoff do not lead to an equal subjective
mean reward.Wemodeled subject-specific nonlinearities using a
parameter a as the ratio of the subjective utilities of 40¢ and 20¢
[U(40)  a  U(20); see Materials and Methods]. As expected,
subject-specific parameter fits resulted in an overall monotonically
decreasing relationship between a and behavioral risk aversion
across subjects (Fig. 3e; Spearman’s rankcorrelation,
0.91;p
106, one-tailed Student’s t test).
In the third model (risk-sensitive TD learning; Fig. 3c), risk
sensitivity arises from an explicitly risk-sensitive variant of TD
learning that penalizes or favors outcome variance through
asymmetric learning frompositive and negative prediction errors
(Shapiro et al., 2001; Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002). If negative
errors have the effect of decreasing Vnew (stimulus) more than
positive errors increase it, then the learned value will be lower
than the mean nominal outcome, leading to risk aversion. Con-
versely, higher learning rates for positive compared to negative
prediction errors will result in overestimation of the values of
risky options and thus to risk seeking. This underestimation or
overestimation of values only occurs for risky options, as these
are, by definition, associatedwith persistent positive and negative
prediction errors.We correlated the normalized difference between
the two fit learning rates for each subject (  )/(  )
with behavioral risk aversion across subjects (Fig. 3f). As expected,
this correlation was highly significant (Pearson’s correlation, r 
0.90; p 106, one-tailed Student’s t test).
Model comparison
We compared the posterior likelihoods of each subject’s choice
data according to each of the three models to evaluate which
model provides the best fit for each subject. Likelihood ratio tests
to assess the contribution of the extra parameter in the more
complex RSTD or utility models (compared to the simpler TD
model) showed that the additional parameter was justified in 14
Figure 3. Three qualitatively different models for risk-sensitive choice. a, TDmodel: biased sampling that tends to choose the better of two options implies that fluctuations in the prediction of
risky options below theirmean persist longer than fluctuations above theirmean. Simulation of five choice trials, starting fromequal predictionsV(A)V(B) 20,with 0.5, and preferential
choice of the stimuluswith thehigher predicted value are shown. The sure option,A, dominates.b, Utilitymodel: concave (solid) or convex (dashed) nonlinear subjective utility functions for different
monetary rewards lead to risk-averse or risk-seeking behavior, respectively. c, RSTDmodel: positive prediction errors 0 are weighted by during learning, while negative prediction errors
areweighted by.Whereas symmetricweighting () results in an average predictive value of 20 for the 0/40¢ stimulus (left), losses loom larger if, leading to a value that
is on average smaller than 20, and consequently to risk aversion (middle), and conversely when for (right). d–f, Parameter fits for three different models that can potentially explain
the subjects’ risk-sensitive choices. Each subject’s best-fit parameter values are plotted against the fraction of their choices of the 20¢ stimulus over the alternative 0/40¢ stimulus throughout the
whole experiment. d, In the classic TDmodel, higher learning rates () account for more risk aversion (Niv et al., 2002). e, In the utility model, risk-neutral subjects have values of a near 2 (dashed
horizontal line), implying a rather linear utility function for this range of monetary rewards; a is lower than 2 for risk-averse subjects (consonant with a concave utility function), and higher than 2
for risk seekers (consonantwith a convex utility function). f, In the RSTDmodel, the normalized difference between and is strongly correlatedwith risk sensitivity (Mihatsch and Neuneier,
2002).
556 • J. Neurosci., January 11, 2012 • 32(2):551–562 Niv et al. • Risk-Sensitive Learning in the Human Brain
of 16 subjects for the RSTD model, but only in 6 of 16 for the
utility model (	2 test with one degree of freedom, p 0.05). As
the utility and RSTD models have the same number of parame-
ters, we compared their posterior likelihoods directly. This
showed that the RSTDmodel provided a better fit that the utility
model for all but one subject (Fig. 4).
Prediction error signaling in the nucleus accumbens
The above results showed that the behavioral data strongly fa-
vored the RSTD model. Another way to test which model best
aligns with human learning in this task is by comparing the pre-
dictions of the three models to neural measurements of the
learned values of the stimuli. Here, the three models make qual-
itatively different predictions (supplemental Fig. 2, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material): The TD model
predicts that in forced trials, in which choice biases are elimi-
nated, the values of the 20¢ stimulus and the 0/40¢ stimulus
would be similar. According to the utility model, if a 
 2, the
values of these two stimuli will be unequal even if only forced
trials are taken into account.Moreover, the utilitymodel predicts
that nonlinearity in the values of the sure 40¢ and 20¢ stimuli
should match the subjects’ risk-sensitive behavior: risk-averse
subjects should exhibit concavity [2 V(20)  V(40)], and risk-
seeking subjects convexity [2 V(20) V(40)]. Finally, the RSTD
model also predicts a lawful relationship between the difference
V(20)  V(0/40) and risk-sensitive choice. However, unlike the
utility model, according to the RSTD model, the evaluation of
deterministic options should still be linear in the nominal out-
comes, since they do not induce persistent prediction errors.
To test these predictions, we took advantage of the fact that
under all threemodels the prediction error at the time of stimulus
onset theoretically corresponds to the (learned) value of the stim-
ulus. Thus, we could use fMRI BOLD signals shown previously to
correlate with reward prediction errors to extract from activa-
tions at the time of stimulus onset the neural values of the differ-
ent stimuli and determine which model is best supported by the
neural data.
Numerous previous fMRI studies employing whole-brain
analysis methods have shown that BOLD activity in the ventral
striatum of humans engaged in classical or instrumental condi-
tioning is correlated with prediction errors (McClure et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004; Abler et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006;
Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2007),
and that when monetary rewards are used, this signal is more
specifically located in the nucleus accumbens (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; Knutson et al., 2005; Daw et al., 2006; Kim et al.,
2006; Scho¨nberg et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008). Therefore, to
determine prediction errors (and thence from them to extract the
neural values of stimuli), we defined two a priori ROIs, one in the
left and one in the right nucleus accumbens. Given the variable
size of these nuclei across subjects and the unreliability of stan-
dard normalization of brain images when dealing with subcorti-
cal nuclei (D’Ardenne et al., 2008), we delineated these structures
separately for each subject using anatomical criteria (see Materi-
als and Methods). Indeed, individual ROIs in normalized Mon-
treal Neurological Institute coordinates showed relatively weak
between-subject overlap (Fig. 5a; supplemental Fig. 3, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
We first assessed qualitatively whether the BOLD signal in
these ROIs indeed reflected a temporal difference prediction er-
ror signal. For this we aligned raw BOLD signal time courses to
the onset of the stimuli, correcting only for scanner drift, mean
baseline, and motion artifacts (see Materials and Methods). Fig-
ure 5b shows the time course of the activations averaged over all
subjects and both ROIs, and divided according to the chosen
stimulus (the 0/40¢ trials were further divided according to the
actual outcome on these trials; the two stimuli predicting 0¢ were
combined). As a point of comparison, we considered what form
these signals would take if they represented the theoretical pre-
diction errors in our task. In all three models, prediction errors
occur at two time points in each trial (Fig. 5c): at the time of the
stimulus, corresponding to the expected value of the chosen op-
tion, and at the time of the outcome, corresponding to the differ-
ence between the reward and this expectation. Since we expected
the BOLD signal to reflect subject-specific prediction errors dur-
ing learning, we used the fit parameters for each subject in con-
junction with his or her own sequence of choices and payoffs to
create a personalized prediction error sequence. By convolving
these prediction errors with the canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function (Fig. 5d) and averaging across subjects and trials,
we obtained the expected signature for a grand average prediction
error BOLD signal (Fig. 5e).
Visual comparison of Figure 5, b and e, shows that the aver-
aged responses in the NAC ROIs were extremely similar to the
activations we expected to see based on the TD prediction error,
in both general form and ordinal relations. Notably, BOLD sig-
nals associated with stimulus onset roughly corresponded to the
value of the chosen option, and in trials in which a sure option
was chosen, no additional BOLD response was seen at the pre-
sentation of the (expected) payoff. For the 0/40¢ stimulus, how-
ever, a second BOLD response was above or below baseline in
correspondence with positive and negative prediction errors due
to the 40¢ or 0¢ outcomes, respectively. We also found that the
activations in the left and right ROIs were very similar (supple-
mental Fig. 4, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). The one qualitative discrepancy between predicted and
actual BOLD responses was a positive response associated with
the onset of the sure 0¢ stimulus and a negative response at the
time of the 0¢ outcome (yellow). This response patternmay have
resulted from confusion or generalization between stimuli at the
beginning of the experiment, as it disappeared after the first ses-
sion (supplemental Fig. 5, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material).
We verified these results statistically by modeling the time
course in each ROI as a linear combination of the three necessary
components of a prediction error signal, (t)  V(t)  r(t) 
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Figure4. Direct comparison of the posterior probability per choice trial for the utility and the
RSTD models shows that the RSTD model assigns a higher average probability per trial to the
choices of 15 out of 16 subjects. The average probability assigned to a choice trial for each
subject is the likelihood of the data divided by the number of choice trials. This provides a
measure of the choice variance explained by themodel (chance, 0.5). The one subject for which
the utility model assigned a higher probability per choice is denoted by.
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V(t 1), in our task: (1)V(t), the value of the chosen stimulus at
time of stimulus onset, (2) r(t) the magnitude of the reward at
time of outcome, and (3)V(t1) the negative of the expected
value at time of outcome. All three regressors were significant at
the p 0.05 level in each of the ROIs (right NAC, value at stim-
ulus, p 0.003; reward at outcome, p 0.030; negative value at
outcome, p  0.003; left NAC, value at stimulus, p  0.003;
reward at outcome, p  0.018; negative value at outcome, p 
0.026), with positive average regression coefficients in all cases.
Moreover, as predicted by the fact that at outcome the prediction
error is (toutcome) r(toutcome) V(toutcome), there was a strong
correlation across subjects between the regression coefficients for
the reward and negative value regressors (Fig. 6). For both ROIs,
Bayes factors comparing the odds ratio for the null hypothesis
that the regression coefficients for r(toutcome) and for V(tout-
come) are equal versus the hypothesis that they are unequal sup-
ported the null hypothesis (Bayes factors for the right NAC were
4.02 and 3.09, and for left NAC were 5.29 and 4.12, using an
uninformative prior and a unit-informative prior, respectively).
Relationship between learned values and risk preference
Together, the above ROI results confirmed that NAC BOLD sig-
nals correspond to a prediction error signal. They furthermore
showed that the signals associated with the onset of the sure 20¢
and the risky 0/40¢ stimuli reflected similar subjective values, on
average. The main aim of our study was to determine whether
subject-specific behavioral risk sensitivity was related to differ-
ences in the evaluation of these stimuli. We thus used impulse
function regressors aligned on stimulus onsets in forced trials to
extract from the prediction error signals the mean values of the
different stimuli for each subject in each session, while modeling
away prediction errors for all other events using a separate regres-
sor (see Materials and Methods). We only used forced trials to
extract values for two reasons: First, choice trials are biased to-
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Figure 5. a, Overlap between anatomical ROIs depicted on the average anatomical image of the subjects. Darker red (right NAC) and blue (left NAC) denote a higher degree of overlap between
the ROIs of different subjects. b, The raw BOLD signal (in arbitrary units) as extracted from the ROIs in a, aligned on trial onset, averaged over all subjects and all trials, and separated according to
chosen stimulus andpayoff. Shading corresponds to the SEM for each trace. Comparewithe. c, Illustration of the theoretical asymptotic prediction errors for each stimulus. Stimuli (presented at time
t 0) appear unpredictably and so induce prediction errors approximately equal to their mean values (40 and 20 for the sure stimuli and 20 for risky stimulus, ignoring subject-specific risk-related
perturbations for purposes of illustration only). For the sure stimuli, the outcomes (at t 5) are fully predicted, and thus induce no further prediction errors. For the 0/40¢ stimulus, the 40¢ outcome
induces a positive prediction error (red solid line) of	20; the 0¢ outcome induces a negative prediction error of approximately (20) (red dashed line). The 0¢ stimulus (data not shown) is not
expected to generate a prediction error at time of stimulus onset or payoff. d, The canonical hemodynamic response function. e, Model prediction errors at the time of the stimulus and outcome for
every subject for each condition (using individual best-fit parameters for the RSTDmodel) were convolved with the hemodynamic response function (d) and averaged to predict the grand average
BOLD signal. The hemodynamic lag adds 5 s to the times to peak (dashed black lines). The yellow trace corresponds to the 0¢ stimuli and is below baseline due to the residual dip from the
hemodynamic response in the previous trial.
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ward stimuli with higher values. As a result, all three models
predict risk-related differences between the sure 20¢ and risky
0/40¢ stimulus values in choice trials, rendering any result we
obtain inconclusive. By comparison, as forced trials allowed
learning without a choice bias, the TDmodel predicted no differ-
ence between the sure 20¢ and risky 0/40¢ stimulus values for
these trials (supplemental Fig. 2, available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material). Second, in choice trials there may be
some ambiguity regarding which of the two stimuli the predic-
tion error might reflect (Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007).
In forced trials there is no such ambiguity.
The correlation between subjects’ behavioral risk preferences
(preference for the sure 20¢ stimulus over the risky 0/40¢ stimu-
lus) and the difference between the extracted neural values of the
20¢ and 0/40¢ stimuli was significantly positivewhen considering
each of the left and right NAC ROIs as samples of the value
differences (Fig. 7a; overall Pearson’s r  0.60, p  0.05; right
NAC only, Pearson’s r 0.60, p 0.05; left NAC only, Pearson’s
r  0.44, p  0.089). This was also true when considering sepa-
rately the value differences and risk sensitivity in each session of
the experiment (Fig. 7b; overall Pearson’s r  0.40, p  0.005;
second session alone, Pearson’s r  0.55, p  0.05, two tailed;
third session alone, Pearson’s r  0.36, p  0.086, marginally
significant one tailed). These results argue against risk-neutral
TD learning, in agreement with our analysis of choice behavior in
the task.
Finally, to differentiate neurally between the utility and RSTD
models, we relied on the fact that the former, but not the latter,
predicts that the nonlinearity in the neural values of the sure 0¢,
20¢, and 40¢ stimuli (which we extracted from the BOLD signal
in the sameway) should correlate with behavioral risk sensitivity.
In contrast to the previous results, we did not find any significant
correlation between neural evaluations of sure outcomes and
subjects’ risk preferences. This was the case when we considered
each ROI as a sample, or used each session as a sample, and for a
variety of ways of assessing the presumed nonlinearity [using
ratios,V(40)/V(20) or [V(40)V(0)]/[V(20)V(0)], or differ-
ences, V(40) V(20) or [V(40) V(20)] [V(20) V(0)]; all
p values 0.05, one sided; supplemental Figure 6, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material]. That we did not
find evidence for nonlinear utilities of 0¢, 20¢, and 40¢ payoffs in
this task is maybe not surprising, as the monetary amounts in-
volved were very small and likely in the linear range of the utility
curve (see Discussion). In any case, together, these results suggest
that reinforcement learning in the brain is influenced by the risk
associated with different payoffs, for instance, as is implemented
in the RSTD model.
Whole-brain analysis
Our analysis so far has concentrated on a priori, anatomically
defined regions of interest in the nucleus accumbens. In a sup-
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Figure 6. Regression coefficients for the obtained reward and the expected value at time of
outcome in the two anatomically defined ROIs. Each data point represents one subject. In each
ROI, the coefficients are strongly correlated (right NAC, dashed line, 
 0.72; p 0.002;
regression slope, 0.66; left NAC, solid line, 
 0.70; p 0.003; regression slope, 0.88).
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Figure 7. Risk sensitivity can be inferred from neural values extracted from prediction error
signals. The neural values of the sure 20¢ stimulus and the risky 0/40¢ stimulus were extracted
from the BOLD signal for each anatomical ROI and for each subject. a, Across subjects, the
difference between the neural values of these two stimuli correlated with behavioral risk aver-
sion, with similar correlations apparent when considering each of the ROIs separately. b, When
considering each session separately (and averaging over both ROIs to reduce noise), the corre-
lations between value differences and behavioral risk sensitivity were remarkably similar, de-
spite the fact that behavioral risk aversion within subjects varied widely across sessions.
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plemental analysis, we searched the whole brain for areas corre-
lating with the RSTD prediction error regressor. We designated
as functional ROIs all activations that survived a whole-brain-
corrected threshold of p  0.05, leading to five small clusters of
activation: three in the striatum (left NAC and two noncontigu-
ous activations in the left tail of the caudate), one in the orbito-
frontal cortex, and one in the cerebellum (Table 1; for the raw
time courses from these ROIs, see supplemental Fig. 7, available
at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). To determine
which of these areas indeed corresponded to a prediction error
signal, in a post hoc (nonindependent) analysis, we asked
whether each ROI was significantly correlated with each of the
three necessary components of the prediction error signal in our
task: (1) the value of the chosen stimulus at time of stimulus
onset, (2) the magnitude of the reward at time of outcome, and
(3) the negative of the expected value at time of outcome. As
expected from our (fully independent) analysis of anatomical
ROIs in the NAC, this analysis showed that the nucleus accum-
bens corresponds fully to a prediction error signal. However, this
was not true for any of the other areas identified in the whole-
brain analysis, where in each case activity failed to correlate sig-
nificantly with one or more of the prediction-error components.
This suggests that theNAC shows themost consistent evidence of
neural prediction error coding out of all the areas implicated by
the whole-brain analysis.
Discussion
We investigated the neural basis of risk-sensitive choice in an
experiential learning task.Wewere particularly interested in neu-
ral representations associated with reinforcement learning, ask-
ing whether these were sensitive only to mean payoffs, as
traditional theory suggests, or whether some of the effects of risk
on choice may be realized through this form of learning. Using a
priori anatomically defined ROIs in the NAC, we first confirmed
that the dominant component of the raw BOLD signal in the
NAC corresponds to a reward prediction error, a key component
in reinforcement-learning models.
We then extracted from this prediction error signal the neural
representations of the subjective values of different stimuli and
showed that these correlated significantly with risk-sensitive
choice: subjects for whom the extracted values of the sure 20¢
stimulus were greater than those of the risky 0/40¢ stimulus were
more risk averse in their choices, and those whose neural signals
favored the risky stimulus were behaviorally more risk seeking.
Moreover, experience-related session-by-session fluctuations in
the subjective evaluations of these two options correlated signifi-
cantly with risk sensitivity in each session, testifying to the relation-
ship between values estimated through reinforcement learning and
behavioral choice.
Traditional TD reinforcement learning estimates the mean
rewards associated with different options, ignoring their vari-
ance. The TD model therefore predicted similar values for the
sure and risky options, and so was inconsistent with our results.
Common accounts of risk sensitivity involving nonlinear utility
functions (Bernoulli, 1954; Smallwood, 1996) were also not
supported by the results of our analysis of the values of sure
outcomes. This was evident from the poor behavioral fits, as well
as the lack of neural support for the utility model. Although the
latter was a null result and thus inconclusive, we note that this
analysis had similar power to the analysis of differences between
the values of the 0/40¢ and 20¢ stimuli, which did reach signifi-
cance on all measures.Moreover, risk sensitivity in the domain of
small payoffs (such as those we used here) is generally incompat-
ible with accounts based on nonlinear utility (Rabin and Thaler,
2001). Thus, although it is possible, even likely, that large out-
comes are subjectively valued in a nonlinear way, another source
of sensitivity to risk is likely at play in causing the risk sensitivity
that we observed in the domain of small outcomes.
Our results are consistent with risk-sensitive TD (RSTD)
learning. In RSTD learning, nonlinearity is associated with the
learning process rather than the evaluation of outcomes, with
positive and negative prediction errors having asymmetric affects
on changes in predictions (Fig. 3c). Applying a nonlinear trans-
formation to prediction errors (as in RSTD learning) rather than
to outcomes (as in the utility model) maintains the simplicity of
recursive learning, as in traditional TD learning (Mihatsch and
Neuneier, 2002). This form of learning predicts a precise rela-
tionship between amount of outcome variance and deviations
from the risk-neutral mean value, as a function of the differences
between  and  for each subject. Because in the present
experiment only one stimulus was associated with variable out-
comes, we could not compare the effects of different degrees of
variance, leaving this for future work. Another yet-unanswered
question is whether the asymmetry is fixed, or adapts to the
amount of risk in the task (or to other characteristics such as
volatility or amount of training). For instance, Preuschoff et al.
(2008) identify neural substrates correlating with signals that can
be used to learn explicitly about the risk associated with different
outcomes.
NAC BOLD signals have been implicated previously, directly
and indirectly, in representing prediction errors. Early fMRI
studies showed that the NAC is activated by monetary or other
gains (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2005; Kuhnen andKnut-
son, 2005), while model-driven analyses have shown convinc-
ingly that BOLD signals in the NAC (as well as in other areas of
the ventral striatum extending to the ventral putamen, and in
some tasks to more dorsal striatal areas) correlate well with a
prediction error in a variety of pavlovian or instrumental condi-
tioning tasks (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004;
Abler et al., 2006; Li et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2006; Seymour et al.,
2007). A recent study that used an experimental design aimed
specifically at teasing apart prediction errors, outcome value, and
decision value, showed that NAC BOLD responses correlate with
Table 1. All clusters that survived a whole-brain familywise error-corrected threshold of p< 0.05 in the random effects contrast for an RSTD prediction error signal
Anatomical location Peak x, y, z (mm) Cluster size t(15) V(stimulus) (at stimulus) Reward (at outcome) V(stimulus) (at outcome)
Left nucleus accumbens 15, 6,15 4 8.02 p 0.0001** p 0.0011** p 0.0001**
Right tail of caudate 21,12, 24 4 8.34 p 0.0436* p 0.3884 p 0.0476*
Right tail of caudate 24,36, 3 3 10.73 p 0.0185* p 0.8693 p 0.8979
Tail of caudate combined 7 p 0.0098** p 0.6123 p 0.2320
Left orbitofrontal cortex 15, 36,18 6 10.13 p 0.0231* p 0.0350 p 0.3969
Left cerebellum 29,78,36 4 8.04 p 0.1728 p 0.0401* p 0.0198*
Anatomical locationswere determined through inspectionwith respect to the average anatomical image of all 16 subjects. Tail of caudate combined is a combined cluster including the twodisjoint clusters in the right tail of the caudate.
*p 0.05; ** significant after Bonferroni correction for 18 comparisons (post hoc analyses).
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a prediction error signal and not other related value signals (Hare
et al., 2008). Our supplemental analysis of other regions that were
identified as potential prediction error correlates showed that
signals there did not, in fact, satisfy all three defining features of a
prediction error signal.
It is commonly believed that striatal BOLD signals reflect (at
least appetitive) prediction errors because of dopaminergic input
to this area (although other influences also weigh in) (Knutson et
al., 2005; Knutson and Gibbs, 2007; Schott et al., 2008). Our
results may thus have implications for the semantics of dopami-
nergic firing patterns and their downstream effects, either of
which could be responsible for the asymmetric weighting of pre-
diction errors in RSTD. Dopaminergic representations of nega-
tive and positive prediction errors are asymmetric because of the
low baseline firing rate of these neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Bayer and Glimcher, 2005); however, this need not necessarily
result in asymmetric effects on downstream targets (Niv et al.,
2005). Furthermore, at least in the BOLD signal, we did not find
risk-sensitivity-related asymmetry in the prediction errors at the
time of the outcome (Seymour et al., 2004). It is, however,
straightforward to imagine that the inherently different synaptic
processes of long-term potentiation and depression could result
in asymmetric effects of increased or decreased levels of dopa-
mine on downstream plasticity (Wickens et al., 2003; Shen et al.,
2008).
Neither of the two previous studies that have associated NAC
BOLD signals with risk involved learning. Matthews et al. (2004)
showed selective activation in NAC during risk taking that was cor-
relatedwith a harm-avoidance scale across subjects. Preuschoff et al.
(2006) identified a correlate of anticipated risk in the NAC BOLD
signal. This component is different fromours, since it appeared later
in the trial, closer to the time of the outcome. It may be related to
ramping dopaminergic signals that have sometimes been seen in
single-unit recordings in a taskwithprobabilistic rewards (Fiorillo et
al., 2003), andmight reflect nonlinearities in the coding (rather than
the effect) of prediction errors (Niv et al., 2005).
Although we have discussed the proposal that risk is incorpo-
rated within learned values, it is conceivable that expected value
and risk are represented and learned separately, with the two
signals converging at the level of the NAC (or at least in the NAC
BOLD signal). Risk and return are typically separated in financial
theory (also related to Markowitz portfolio theory) (Markowitz,
1952; Weber et al., 2004; Weber and Johnson, 2008). Indeed,
previous studies of risk-sensitive choice have implicated cortical
areas such as insula, posterior cingulate cortex, the orbitofrontal
cortex and medial prefrontal cortex in tracking and representing
risk (Elliott et al., 1999; Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Knutson and Bossaerts,
2007; Tobler et al., 2007; Platt andHuettel, 2008; Preuschoff et al.,
2008). However, these studies all involved explicit knowledge of
the risks. This was also the case in a study of ambiguity aversion
that showed that ambiguity influences striatal BOLD signals (al-
beit arguing that its effect on choice was mediated by an orbito-
frontal representation) (Hsu et al., 2005). As a result, these
studies, and the mechanism that they suggest for incorporating
risk into choice, may be more relevant to model-based decision
making. In the present study as well, a contrast between trials
involving risk and all other trials showed prominent activations
in bilateral anterior insula and supplementary motor area (sup-
plemental Fig. 8, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material), perhaps suggesting thatmodel-based learning was tak-
ing place in parallel to model-free learning in the areas that we
investigated (Daw et al., 2005).
In sum, our results provide evidence that risk sensitivity is
indeed present in prediction error signaling in the nucleus ac-
cumbens, with a direct correlation between the risk-averse or
risk-seeking choices of our subjects and the neural prediction
error signals. This finding supports a reinforcement-learning-
based account of risk sensitivity at least in cases in which payoffs
must be learned from experience and suggests that risk sensitiv-
ity, as in RSTD learning, should be imported into computational
models of human choice. Furthermore, it can potentially provide
insight into the functions of related neural substrates such as
dopamine. Thus, our study completes a full circle starting from
computational theory, through the psychology of affective
choice, to the neural basis in signals in the nucleus accumbens,
and back again to influence and inform the computational
theory.
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